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The Issue of Intent in the Genocide
Convention and Its Effect on the
Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Toward a
Knowledge-Based Approach
Katherine Goldsmith
Since the Genocide Convention was created in 1948, its effectiveness has been
hindered by debates on what the definition actually means. It has been widely
accepted that the meaning of ‘‘intent,’’ within the Genocide Convention, refers to
specific or special intent, dolus specialis. However, as more trials have taken place,
creating more understanding of the crime of genocide, the linking of dolus specialis
with the intent definition, that was so easily accepted at the first genocide trial
(Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]), has been
repeatedly put into question. The new approach being put forward as the most
appropriate interpretation of ‘‘intent’’ is the knowledge-based approach. The
Vienna Convention on Treaties states that interpretations of laws should follow
the treaty’s original purpose and objective, and should do this by looking at the
preparatory work and its circumstances. By looking at the Travaux Préparatoires
of the Genocide Convention and Raphael Lemkin’s original writings on the subject,
this article will discuss which approach fits the original intentions of both the
drafters of the Convention and Lemkin himself, to determine which interpretation
should be used in the future when considering the crime of genocide.
Key words: Genocide Convention, intent, Raphael Lemkin, Darfur, ICTR, ICTY

The Origins of the Term ‘‘Genocide’’
While studying at the University of Lvov, Raphael Lemkin, a twenty-one-year-old
Polish Jew, came across an article on Soghomon Tehlirian. Tehlirian was an
Armenian Genocide survivor on trial for the murder of Mehmet Talaat, one of the
orchestrators of the Armenian Genocide, who had at the time escaped prosecution.
‘‘Lemkin asked [his professor] why the Armenians did not have Talaat arrested for
the massacre. The professor said there was no law under which he could be arrested.
‘Consider the case of a farmer, who owns a flock of chickens,’ he said. ‘He kills them
and this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.’ ’’ 1 Finding this gap in
international law intolerable, Lemkin began work on an international law proposal
for this sort of crime.
Raphael Lemkin originally created two new international laws: ‘‘barbarity’’ and
‘‘vandalism.’’ These laws were presented to the Fifth International Conference for
the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in 1933,2 in Lemkin’s absence. Because of
travel visa problems and opposition from the Polish government, he could not attend.
His proposal also referenced the discrimination taking place in Germany against the
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Jews as a cause for concern. Although receiving little positive response from leaders,
he continued to press for action on this issue.
Lemkin then became caught up in World War II. He escaped to Sweden in 1940,
and then the United States in 1941. While documenting his findings on Nazi actions
and laws imposed in occupied Europe, he continued lobbying the US government
to take action to stop these atrocities. On hearing Winston Churchill’s 1941 speech
referring to the situation in occupied Europe as ‘‘a crime without a name,’’ Lemkin
realized that he needed to find the appropriate name for this crime.
In 1944, Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of
Government, Proposals for Redress was published containing the word ‘‘genocide’’ to
describe the ‘‘crime without a name.’’ Lemkin stated that genocide (from the Greek
term for race or tribe, genos, and the Latin word for killing, cide,) was ‘‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.’’ 3
Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather
to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. . . . Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but
as members of the national group.4

When World War II ended, the extent of the Nazis’ atrocities was revealed and the
Allies began discussing appropriate punishments for these crimes. The Nuremberg
Trials were established, in 1945, with jurisdiction over three categories of crimes:
‘‘crimes against peace,’’ ‘‘war crimes,’’ and ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’ Though genocide was cited in the indictments, the convictions reflecting the actions of the Nazis
were regarded as crimes against humanity.
After the Nuremberg Trials, many were concerned with the gap in international
law that meant the actions taken by the Nazis before the war, being out of the context of war, were not covered under the Nuremberg Charter. Lemkin consistently
lobbied at the UN for a resolution on the crime of genocide. Due largely to his efforts,
the United Nations General Assembly began discussions on whether genocide should
be a crime under international law.
On 11 December 1946, the General Assembly Resolution 96(I) declared ‘‘that
genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns,
and for the commission of which principals and accomplices—whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious,
racial, political or any other grounds—are punishable.’’ 5 The General Assembly then
referred the issue to the Economic and Social Council asking them to create a draft
convention for the crime of genocide.
On 9 December 1948, less than two years after the General Assembly declared
genocide a crime under international law, General Assembly Resolution 260(III)A
unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Article II of which defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

239

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.6

The UN Convention is highly important, as it is the key international law that
creates a legal obligation for action in cases of genocide. Once a situation of genocide
has been determined, under the rules of the Convention the ‘‘contracting parties’’
may refer the situation to the UN, which has the responsibility to act, in line with
the purpose of the Convention, to prevent further atrocities and punish any already
committed. Since the adoption of the Convention, the UN’s response has been
paralyzed by legal debates about what the definition actually means, and whether a
situation is or is not genocide, according to the definition in the Convention.
As stated above, the Convention was created to prevent and punish the crime of
genocide. Although punishment is self-explanatory, genocide prevention can mean
either preventing genocidal actions from ever taking place or preventing further
atrocities once genocide has arguably begun. For the purpose of this article, it means
the latter. It is worth pointing out that though action should also take place to stop
other mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, these actions are more in relation to the first meaning (prevent genocide ever taking place). Genocide prevention,
in the sense of prevention before it ever takes place, could in turn prevent many
other atrocities when effective steps are put in place. At the early stages of genocide,
for example, there are many acts that are crimes in their own right. Similarly,
preventing other international human rights abuses, such as hate crimes, could in
turn have a positive effect on preventing genocide. Because this article concerns
prevention meaning preventing further atrocities once genocide has begun, it will
not look at preventing other crimes. In addition, this article explores the Genocide
Convention, so arguments around intent will be looked at in relation to the crime of
genocide only.
In relation to Gregory Stanton’s ‘‘8 Stages of Genocide’’,7 once genocide reaches
the seventh stage (extermination, where the systematic killing begins), in most genocide cases, the majority of killing happens early on. During the Rwandan genocide,
for example, ‘‘about 80 percent of the victims died in a ‘hurricane of death . . . between
the second week of April and the third week of May’.’’ 8 Although there are many
stages before the extermination stage, these earlier stages, as discussed, can show
signs of crimes other than genocide. As the legal obligation lies with genocide, many
have used this excuse (that these actions are not the beginning of the genocidal process
but are a different crime altogether) for non-involvement in stopping the atrocities.
Therefore, the possibility of preventive action is rarely, if ever, spoken of until mass
violence has commenced. Once it is spoken of, this is where the problematic general
conversations regarding genocide begin. It is crucial that preventative action take
precedence over general conversations about genocide. A decision could be reached
more quickly if the definition of genocide was clearer. One of the main difficulties
with the definition concerns the element of ‘‘intent.’’
The Genocide Convention, as stated above, simply reads, ‘‘genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a . . . group,
as such.’’ The type of intent required (e.g., dolus specialis, dolus eventualis, general,
or knowledge-based) is not stated. This absence of a clear definition has resulted in
much debate and arguably hindered the effectiveness of the Convention. Although
there may be other reasons hindering action, the question surrounding the meaning
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of ‘‘intent’’ comes up frequently, and if this barrier was removed, it would be one less
obstacle preventing action, and one less excuse for states to use.
The people involved in international law come from different countries with
different legal systems, which can cause problems. The different levels of ‘‘intent’’
vary from one system to another, creating conflict when determining what degree of
intent is required for different international crimes, and whether a perpetrator is
guilty or not. The type of intent regularly associated with genocide is the RomanoGermanic civil law term, dolus specialis. Recently, many scholars have argued that
dolus specialis is too strict and that a knowledge-based approach should be adopted,
which is more closely related to the intent required in a common-law legal system.
Specific intent (dolus specialis) will be discussed here first, along with the negative
effect it has on genocide prevention and punishment. A knowledge-based approach will
then be examined. Following this, in order to determine what the Convention means
by ‘‘intent,’’ there will be an exploration of the discussions that occurred during the
drafting of the Convention and of the reasons the Convention was originally created.

Dolus Specialis (Specific Intent)
Dolus specialis ‘‘demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged.’’ 9 In relation to genocide, it means the perpetrator commits an act while
clearly seeking to destroy the particular group, in whole or in part.
Genocide has been dubbed the ‘‘crime of all crimes’’ and, for some, should require
the highest form of intent. The UN International Law Commission (ILC), in the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind commentaries
(1996), states that a general intent would not be sufficient and that genocide
‘‘requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall
consequence of the prohibited act.’’ 10 Guenael Mettraux continues this argument by
stating that ‘‘genocide was adopted to sanction a very specific sort of criminal action.
It would be regrettable to denature genocide for the sake of encompassing within its
terms as many categories and degrees of criminal involvement as possible.’’ 11
A prominent argument for the specific intent requirement is that dolus specialis
is what separates the crime of genocide from other international crimes, e.g., crimes
against humanity. This argument is put forward by many, including William Schabas,
who states that ‘‘[w]hat sets genocide apart from crimes against humanity and war
crimes is that the act . . . must be committed with the specific intent to destroy in
whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.’’ 12 Some argue
that this distinction is very important as it holds genocide above crimes against
humanity in relation to the seriousness of the crime.
Dolus specialis is seen by some as the only appropriate intent level for the crime
of genocide, as allowing any lower form of intent would risk situations that result in
the destruction of a group, with no intent of this destruction taking place, being
wrongly seen as genocide. Within the same legal system as dolus specialis, the intent
one level below is known as dolus eventualis. In relation to genocide, this means that
the perpetrator knows that his/her actions may bring about the destruction of a
group, but continues to commit these acts. Reducing the level of intent would mean
that those not specifically intending the destruction of the targeted group could be
open to convictions for genocide. Dolus eventualis is too low a level of intent for the
severity of the crime of genocide; therefore, the only option for those in that legal
system is to require dolus specialis. Another lower level of intent is general intent.
This requires that the perpetrator intends to commit the killing, but not necessarily
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to destroy the group. This term is also too low for the level at which the crime of
genocide is held.

Problems with the Dolus Specialis Interpretation of the Convention
Before discussing the movement for a knowledge-based approach, we need to consider why this movement arose. The main difficulty with dolus specialis, which has
been argued for many years, is in obtaining actual proof, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the perpetrator’s intention was to destroy the group, in whole or in part. Intent
refers to a person’s state of mind, a private thought process that, unless explicitly
stated, is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Lawrence LeBlanc argues,
The most prominent argument on the notion of intent was advanced by Jean-Paul
Sartre. Pointing out, quite correctly, that the Genocide Convention ‘‘was tacitly
referring to memories which were still fresh,’’ namely, to Hitler’s ‘‘proclaimed . . .
intent to exterminate the Jews,’’ Sartre asserted that not all governments, including
that of the United States, would be as stupid as Hitler’s and proclaim such demonic
intentions. . . . The authors of such a genocidal plan would not necessarily be
‘‘thoroughly conscious of their intention.’’ This would be ‘‘impossible to decide. We
would have to plumb the depths of their consciences. . . .’’ 13

Cherif Bassiouni adds that
it is not difficult to think of a number of contemporary conflicts, such as those in
Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, where there is obviously no paper trail and
where the specific intent can only be shown by the cumulative effect of the objective
conduct to which one necessarily has to add the inference of specific intent deriving
from omission.14

In terms of preventing further atrocities and stopping genocide, proving a perpetrator’s state of mind is a massive problem. Perpetrators are fully aware that admitting
what they are doing could interfere with achieving their objective. They are therefore
unlikely to admit what their intentions are and thus risking possible action against
them, especially if the objective of destroying the target group is still taking place.

Negative Effects on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide
One situation that highlights the controversy surrounding proving specific intent is
Darfur, which turned into genocide in 2003. ‘‘Since it erupted in 1983, the internal
conflict between the North and the South has had a significant impact on Sudan in
many ways. It is the longest conflict in Africa involving serious human rights abuses
and humanitarian disasters.’’ 15 While the North and South were negotiating a peace
agreement, Darfur, which is situated on the western edge of the country, was left
behind. Due to resentment of the government by the Darfuris, an insurgency began
against the government. Starting in late 2002, rebel military action began by targeting police offices and looting weaponry. After rebels briefly seized the Sudanese
government’s airbase in El Fasher in early 2003, the government responded ferociously. The government retaliated, but due to lack of equipment themselves, they
recruited local tribes, mostly Arab, as proxy militias. The retaliation arguably went
beyond simple counterinsurgency, with entire villages being attacked. Sudanese
planes bombed villages, and then government troops and government armed militia
(Janjaweed) entered the targeted villages, raping the women, killing people that
were left, and polluting the water supply before burning the villages to the ground.
(All of this is evidence shown in the UN Report, 2005).
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The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was set up in 2004,
to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide
have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to
ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.16

For the purposes of this article, the focal part of this report is the section determining whether genocide was committed in Darfur:
The Commission found that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate
attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis,
and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive destruction and
displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless
women, men and children . . . The vast majority of the victims of all of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and other so-called
‘‘African’’ tribes.17

The Commission’s report was highly important, as this was the document that
would determine the United Nations’ position on Darfur. There can be no dispute
that the evidence found by the Commission proved the actus reus of genocide.
However, the Commission concluded that ‘‘the crucial element of genocidal intent
appears to be missing; at least as far as the central Government authorities are
concerned.’’ 18 An examination of the evidence produced by the Commission shows
that there are numerous points that they failed to take into account. The Commission failed to provide details regarding what would be necessary for genocidal intent
to be proved. The Commission also failed to consider the decision taken at the
Akayesu Trial, regarding intent being proven from actions. Furthermore, the Commission confused motive with intent, stating that ‘‘the intent was to drive the
victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counterinsurgency warfare.’’ 19
Intent refers to the person’s state of mind at the time of committing the crime.
Motive, on the other hand, refers to what drives the perpetrator to commit their
crime, why they did it, and proof of this is not required for conviction. The perpetrators intended to commit the prohibited acts (discussed in the Report) and kill a
substantial part of the group; the motive behind this was to move the victims off
their land. Regardless of motive, they still intended to destroy a substantial part of
the group, and are, therefore, committing genocide.
This case also shows how unlikely it is that the perpetrators will express their
true intentions. Although, the Commission said they found no genocidal policy, they
were not allowed access to all military documents, which could have proved a
genocidal policy and intent.
34 . . . In a meeting held on 9 November 2004 with Bakri Hassan Salih, Minister of
Defence and other senior Ministry of Defence officials, the Commission requested
access to records of the deployment of military aircraft and helicopter gunships in
Darfur since February 2003. Again, the Commission undertook to treat such records
confidentially. . . . However, a complete set of the records requests was never provided
to the Commission.20

The following day, the Commission asked to see records, which they ensured would
be kept confidential, of government instructions regarding actions taken by the
armed forces against rebels and the civilian population in Darfur’s three states.
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First, Vice-President Taha ensured this would happen. The Commission was told by
the governors of the three states that the minutes of these meetings did not exist,
though the Commission had been informed by reliable sources that they did exist.
The Commission received a general list of final decisions, but the Commission never
saw complete documents.
The specific intention requirement has prevented the Convention from working
effectively and five years after the Commission was first established, Darfur is still
in a disastrous situation. Genocide has taken place in Darfur, as the evidence in
the UN Report proves. Arguably, the decision came down to the issue of intent. A
knowledge-based approach would have found genocide occurred and left it open
for appropriate action to take place. As it stood, with Antonio Cassese heading the
Commission, it chose to adopt a specific (dolus specialis) intent approach.
The Commission proved that the Sudanese government was recruiting and arming the Janjaweed, that there was a coordinated plan to target and destroy specific
villages, and that the target group was identified as one protected by the Genocide
Convention. The dolus specialis requirement meant the Commission was unable
to establish that genocide occurred in Darfur, where at least 100,000 people had
died at the time of the Commission’s report. This seriously calls into question the
appropriateness of the dolus specialis interpretation of the intent requirement in
the Genocide Convention. The intent requirement again failed the purpose of the
Convention and failed to protect a group that is threatened with destruction.

Negative Effects on the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
It has been argued that the dolus specialis requirement has allowed many who have
committed genocide to escape conviction for that crime. A prime example of this can
be seen in the overall failure of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) regarding prosecutions of genocide. Genocide did take place in Srebrenica:
‘‘The [Krstic] Trial Chamber concluded that this campaign to kill all the militaryaged men was conducted to guarantee that the Bosnian Muslim Population would
be permanently eradicated from Srebrenica and therefore constituted genocide.’’ 21
The Appeals Chamber confirmed this. Prior to Krstic, convictions for genocide by
the Trial Chamber were either quashed or reduced to a lesser crime by the Appeals
Chamber. Though the ICTY has recently convicted Vujadin Popovic and Ljubisa
Beara (both ICTY-05-88-T) of genocide (as long as these are also not quashed or
reduced at appeal), the definition of specific intent has still caused much confusion
in decisions made at the ICTY. It has allowed people who have given direct orders
to commit genocide and keenly participated in the genocide of Bosnian Muslim men,
such as Krstic (ICTY-98-33-T) and most recently Drago Nikolic (ICTY-05-88-T), to be
convicted of the lesser offense of ‘‘aiding and abetting’’ genocide.
The most significant case from the ICTY is against Goran Jelesic:
The words and deeds of the accused demonstrate that he was not only perfectly aware
of the discriminatory nature of the operation but also that he fully supported it. It
appears from the evidence submitted to the Trial Chamber that a large majority of
the persons whom Goran Jelisic admitted having beaten and executed were Muslim.
Additionally, many of the elements showed how Goran Jelisic made scornful and
discriminatory remarks about the Muslim population. Often, Goran Jelisic insulted
the Muslims by calling them ‘‘balijas’’ or ‘‘Turks.’’ Of one detainee whom he had just
hit, Goran Jelisic allegedly said that he must be have been mad to dirty his hands
with a ‘‘balija’’ before then executing him.22
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Jelesic had openly admitted to prohibited acts, which constituted the actus reus
for genocide. He was openly using derogatory terms against Muslims, as well as
identifying himself as the ‘‘Serbian Adolf.’’ There was much more evidence presented
during the trial, which all offers very reliable indications as to Jelesic’s state of mind.
The Trial Chamber, however, came to the decision that Jelesic did not possess the
required specific intent, and he was found not guilty of genocide. Although this was
later found incorrect by an Appeals Chamber, it was decided that a retrial would not
take place, meaning he was not convicted of genocide. Although some would argue
that he was convicted of other crimes, and received a forty-year sentence, he was still
not convicted of the crime he committed, which is unacceptable.

Arguments for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation of the Convention
Many in the international community have moved to change the intent requirement
to a knowledge-based approach. This approach is more closely related to the mens
rea in common-law legal systems. The International Criminal Court (ICC) states
‘‘for the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and
‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.’’ 23 For genocide, if the knowledge-based
approach was used it would mean that a person is guilty of genocide if they willingly
commit a prohibited act with the knowledge that it would bring about the destruction of a group. Individuals are unlikely to achieve the destruction of a group by
themselves; they would have to work with others. Therefore, it is enough evidence if
the individual commits an act knowing that it would contribute to other acts being
committed against a particular group, which when put together, would bring about
the destruction of that group, in whole or in part.
In such countries as the UK, some distinguished commentators consider knowledge as
having the same value and intensity as intent, with the difference that intent ‘‘relates
to the consequences specified in the definition of the crime’’ (for instance, death as
a result of killing, in the case of voluntary murder), whereas knowledge ‘‘relates to
circumstances forming part of the definition of the crime’’ (for instance, the circumstance that property belongs to another person, in the case of criminal damage to
property).24

An example in English law would be the situation where a person obtains a gun,
willingly aims it at someone, and pulls the trigger. Due to the high chance that that
victim would die, the perpetrator is seen as having the intent and is therefore guilty
of murder, if the victim dies. In the case of genocide, where the collective actions
of many individuals is considered, one would have to show that there is a high possibility that a collection of prohibited acts aimed at a particular group would bring
about its destruction. Therefore, committing a prohibited act with the knowledge
that it would further a genocidal plan should be sufficient to prove intent.
Other countries’ case law refers to foresight of consequence equalling intent.
As reiterated in Badar (2008), the Ontario Court of Appeal asserted in Regina v.
Buzzanga and Durocher that,
As a general rule, a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially
certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose,
intends that consequence. The actor’s foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of
less, acted so as to produce it, then he decided to bring it about (albeit regretfully) in
order to achieve his ultimate purpose. His intention encompasses the means as well
as to his ultimate objective.25
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A prominent argument for the knowledge-based approach of intent is that the
dolus specialis requirement goes beyond what the Convention actually intended,
and what Lemkin foresaw. Otto Triffterer argues this point, adding that requiring
dolus specialis ‘‘would not only go beyond the wording, but would introduce a concept
not precisely defined . . . [or] . . . generally accepted in Common Law countries. And
even in Civil Law countries the concept of specific or special intent in the sense of
dolus specialis is highly disputed.’’ 26 The prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide is challenging enough. To include an intent requirement that is extremely
difficult to prove after the fact, and which is a contested term in many civil law
countries, renders the Genocide Convention both confusing and ineffective. Such confusion makes the preventive purpose of the Convention nearly impossible to achieve.
The movement for a knowledge-based approach has been given increased weight
by international courts moving toward a more lenient form of intent requirement.
One of the most important decisions regarding proving intent came from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The important judgement came in
the Akayesu case, in which the trial judges stated,
that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. This
is the reason why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be
inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that
it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from
the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed
against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or
by others.27

Allowing intent to be inferred from an individual’s actions does not in its strictest
form, as specific intent requires, prove that the individual’s actions were intended to
destroy a group. It does, however, permit the courts to consider ‘‘foresight of consequences’’, which is in keeping with a knowledge-based approach.
The Kayishema and Ruzindana case also showed the ICTR’s more lenient
approach, which argued that for the mens rea to be complete, the prohibited acts
‘‘should be done in furtherance of the genocidal intent.’’ 28 Arguably, the tribunal
was working under the assumption that if the perpetrator knows of the intent of
others to kill a particular group, and knows his/her actions would contribute to this
intent, but continues to participate, then in a sense the perpetrator does want the
destruction of the group and is, therefore, guilty of genocide.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction
includes genocide, shows a more lenient form of intent being required for the crime
of genocide. Article 30 states:
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.29

How will adopting the knowledge-based approach affect the purpose of the Convention? In terms of prevention, the Convention is there to protect groups from
being destroyed. If there are reports of prohibited acts targeting a protected group
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being committed by people that have the ability to destroy the group, in whole or in
part, then that should be enough to warrant action. The focus would then return to
protecting the groups, rather than focusing on the specific state of mind of the perpetrator. If the knowledge-based approach was adopted, prosecution for the crime
of genocide would be possible for all active participants. Any of the prohibited acts
willingly committed, with the knowledge of the wider destruction being carried out
on the targeted group, would constitute genocide.

The Original Intentions of the Creator and Drafters of the Convention
In order to determine what the Convention means by its definition (‘‘genocide is any
of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
group’’), the reason for the Convention being proposed, and the discussions that
took place during the drafting of the Convention, including arguments for either
dolus specialis or a knowledge-based interpretation, all need to be reviewed. As
Lemkin personally coined the term ‘‘genocide,’’ his original intentions are also important. Throughout Lemkin’s works, he focused on the idea of a group being destroyed
and not on the level of intention behind the perpetrators’ actions. When Lemkin first
coined the term genocide, there was little emphasis on intent. He saw genocide as a
‘‘coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups.’’ 30 He argued that each individual group brings
unique qualities to the collective well-being of humankind and destroying one of
these groups is a serious crime against all humankind and should be prevented and
punished.
Lemkin reiterates this point in his later work, ‘‘Genocide: A Modern Crime,’’
including examples of what the world could be missing out on if it allowed the
destruction of a group. His focus remained on the vital diversity of the human race:
Our whole cultural heritage is a product of the contributions of all nations. We
can best understand when we realize how impoverished our culture would be if
the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been permitted to create
the Bible or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the
opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie, the Czechs a
Hass, and a Dvorak; the Greeks a Plato and Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and
a Shostakovich.31

Arguments for Dolus Specialis during the Drafting of the Convention
Dolus specialis is mentioned three times in the drafting of the Convention: twice
by the Brazilian delegate (see A/C.6/SR.72 and A/C.6/SR.76), and once by the French
(E/AC.25/SR.26). When Brazil mentioned it, it seemed to refer to premeditation
and motive, which were both deemed not necessary within the definition. Arguably,
France mentioned the term simply because that is the highest intent used within
their legal system. It is worth noting that ‘‘mentioned’’ is the correct word to attach
to these statements because, when either country used the term, no other country
affirmed the use of the term further, and none pushed for the dolus specialis intent
to be adopted by the drafters. The term seemed to be completely brushed over by the
other countries during the drafting, arguably showing that its inclusion was not at
all important to the drafters.
Although not specifically mentioning dolus specialis, the Venezuelan delegate
raised concerns over the use of more general forms of intent. Referring to a Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) proposal wanting to change ‘‘committed with
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intent to destroy’’ to ‘‘aiming at the destruction,’’ the Venezuelan delegate pointed
out that in some countries, military personnel had no choice but to obey orders and,
therefore, would risk punishment whatever decision was taken.
According to the definition of genocide given in Article II of the Convention, intent
formed the chief element of the crime. By excluding that element the USSR amendment completely altered the nature of genocide, Mr. Perez Perozo [the Venezuelan
delegate] gave an example a group of soldiers, ordered by an officer to open fire on a
political group and who did so in the belief that they were suppressing disturbances,
whereas the officer had really intended the destruction of the group . . . if they obeyed
the order, they would have committed genocide and if they did not obey it, they would
be guilty of subordination.32

Arguments for a Knowledge-Based Approach during the Drafting
of the Convention
Although not explicitly stating the term knowledge-based approach during the drafting of the Convention, the discussions seemed to be moving more in that direction.
The Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention, May 1947, Article I(I) states
that ‘‘the purpose of this Convention is to prevent the destruction of racial, national,
linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings.’’ 33 Though the list of groups
has narrowed through drafting, the main purpose remains the same. Whenever
trying to find the correct interpretation of the Genocide Convention, the protection
of the groups is paramount and every interpretation needs to be focused on achieving
this purpose. If not, the interpretation is incorrect. You cannot have an interpretation of a Convention that does not allow for the purpose of the Convention to be
achieved. The Peruvian delegate also pointed out that the ‘‘characteristic feature
was the destruction of groups,’’ 34 highlighting again the focus being on groups, and
not on the perpetrators’ level of intent.

Genocide vs. Homicide: The Original Intent of the Intent Requirement
Throughout the creation and drafting of the Genocide Convention, the importance of
the word ‘‘intent’’ within the definition was to separate the crime of genocide from
that of general homicide. This is seen in the General Assembly Resolution 96(I),
which showed the connection between the two crimes: ‘‘Genocide is a denial of
the right of the existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the
right to live of individual human beings.’’ 35 In order to distinguish genocide from
homicide, intent was included to emphasize that the prohibited acts were committed
not to target an individual as an individual, but as a result of his/her association
with the targeted groups. The different acts prohibited within the Convention are
crimes in their own right. The use of ‘‘intent’’ ensured that people committing
general homicide would not be charged with genocide. The crime of genocide is different because while the crime is committed against an individual, it is actually
intended to harm the group with which the individual is associated. Focus throughout the years has centered on the latter part of the definition: ‘‘the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part,’’ a group.’’ This is incorrect. The focus should be on the whole
first part of the definition: ‘‘any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy . . . a group.’’ Genocide is the destruction of selected groups.
The Colour Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘‘group(s)’’ as ‘‘a number of people
or things placed or classed together.’’ 36 One way of destroying the group is by targeting its different parts, which for genocide would be the individuals that make up the
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group. The focus should not be on the need to prove that every perpetrator’s specific
intention is to wipe out the group, but on the prohibited acts that will result in the
destruction of the group. During the drafting of the Convention, the Panamanian
delegate stated that ‘‘the characteristic which distinguished genocide from the common crime of murder was the intention to destroy a group.’’ 37 The United States
delegate reiterated this point: ‘‘The intent to destroy a group[,] which differentiated
the crime of genocide from the crime of simple homicide.’’ 38 The Belgian delegate
concurred.
Throughout the drafting, many discussions focused on finding the correct wording to create an instrument that could be used to protect against the destruction of
groups. The word ‘‘intent’’ was not meant to be the focus of the definition, nor of the
crime of genocide itself, in the way that it has become.
The Draft Convention (6 June 1947) for the prevention and punishment of
genocide stated that ‘‘In this Convention, the word ‘genocide’ is understood to mean
criminal acts against any one of the groups of human beings aforesaid, with the
purpose of destroying them in whole or in part, or of preventing their preservation
or development.’’ 39 The next relevant document was the Secretariat Draft on 26
June 1947 from the Economic and Social Council, which refers to genocide as ‘‘a
criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with
the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part.’’ 40 Discussions that took place on 16
April 1948 showed that the Chinese delegation ‘‘proposed that genocide should be
defined as an act directed against. . . . [groups].’’ 41 The same day, the Committee
adopted a definition ‘‘pending further discussion of the word ‘national’: In this
Convention, the word ‘genocide’ means a criminal act aimed at the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of a group of human beings, for racial, national or religious
reasons.’’ 42
During discussions on 23 April 1948, the Chinese delegate’s proposal of genocide
as an ‘‘act directed against . . . [groups] . . . was adopted by the Committee by six votes
to none, with one abstention.’’43 Other important proposals during the drafting came on
29 April 1948 from the United States, defining genocide as the ‘‘killing of members
of the group with the intention of destroying its physical existence,’’ and ‘‘acts
causing the death of members of the group.’’ 44 Lebanon saw genocide as ‘‘acts which
are intended to . . . destroy groups, directly or indirectly.’’ 45 The wording moved back
to ‘‘directed against’’ but finally settled on ‘‘intent to destroy.’’ Taken in the context of
the words suggested by different delegates before the final text was adopted, and with
delegates pointing out the link between homicide and genocide, the word ‘‘intent’’
within the definition does not point toward requiring a high level of intention. The
significance is that the people who are targeted are seen not as individuals, but as
a part of a group. In order to destroy the group, the individuals need to be destroyed.
Delegates from the USSR and France were some who raised concerns about the
definition being interpreted too restrictively. USSR stated that
If the words ‘‘committed with the intent to. . .’’ were retained, there would be a risk of
ambiguity. The perpetrators of acts of genocide would in certain cases be able to claim
that they were not in fact guilty of genocide, having had no intent to destroy a given
group . . . Rather, therefore, than stipulate the intent to destroy, the article should
define acts of genocide as acts ‘‘resulting in ‘destruction.’ ’’ 46

The USSR also proposed including the wording ‘‘aiming at the destruction’’ rather
than ‘‘with the intent to destroy.’’ On this proposal the French Delegate commented:
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The idea of the USSR was apparently to guard against the possibility that the presence
in the definition of the word ‘‘intent’’ might be used as a pretext, in the future, for
pleading not guilty on the grounds of absence of intent. In the circumstances, the
objective concept seemed to be more effective than the subjective concept.47

Following this opinion, the Greek delegate expressed the idea that some wanted a
less restrictive intent requirement for genocide and ‘‘to leave the judge free to decide,
in each individual case, whether the element of intention was present or not.’’ 48
France agreed, stating:
It was perfectly normal that an international law such as the convention on genocide
should contain instructions to the judges charged with its application. It could not be
asserted that it would thereby restrict the power of judges to determine the responsibility of the accused.49

The delegates wanted the definition broad enough for judges to decide on a case-bycase basis and determine whether the person had ‘‘committed any of the . . . acts
with the intent to destroy a group.’’ This implies leniency, not the strictest form of
intent.

Evaluating Previous Arguments and Developments
The main argument for a stricter interpretation, made by those who advocate invocation of dolus specialis as the intent requirement for genocide, is that it separates the
crime as more serious than other international crimes, such as crimes against
humanity. This, however, is not true. Genocide is a crime against humanity and
was developed from crimes against humanity. Although genocide is a very serious
crime, there are incidents of crimes against humanity that are just as shocking.
Many of the crimes that were committed during Josef Stalin’s tyranny could not be
classified as genocide, yet the number of people who died was much higher than any
genocide that has taken place, and the crimes were equally atrocious. The focus
as stated throughout this article is the destruction of the group, not constructing a
‘‘hierarchy of horrible.’’ 50
During the drafting of the Convention, delegates considered genocide to be a
particular type of crime against humanity. An example of this is the French proposal, including Article 1 that states ‘‘the crime against humanity known as genocide
is an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a member of such
group.’’ 51 The International Law Commission (ILC) also saw the connection: ‘‘The
General Assembly affirmed that the persecution type of crimes against humanity or
‘genocide’ constituted a crime under international law for which individuals were
subject to punishment.’’ 52 This was again pointed out at the ICTR in the Kayishema
and Ruzindana Judgement: ‘‘The definition of the crime of genocide was based upon
that of crimes against humanity, that is, a combination of ‘extermination and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds.’. . . The crime of genocide is a type of
crime against humanity.’’ 53
One of the arguments against all perpetrators being punished is that of superior
orders. Some raise concerns that if people were only following orders, then they
should not be punished. For those who do not have freedom over their actions, this
could be an acceptable defence. But, for those willing participants, it is absurd that
they should be able to escape prosecution for the crimes they commit just because
they were told to do the acts. Superior orders have never been acceptable as a
defence in relation to the crime of genocide and should not be allowed as something
for people to hide behind to escape conviction. From the first time Lemkin introduced
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the term ‘‘genocide,’’ he argued that all parties involved should be punished, regardless of their position within the genocide. In his 1944 book, Lemkin stated, ‘‘In order
to prevent the invocation of the plea of superior orders, the liability of persons who
order the genocide practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders, should
be provided expressly by the criminal codes of the respective countries.’’ 54 Within
the final text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the idea that all should be punished was retained, showing consistency
about superior orders not being an excuse. Under Article 4, ‘‘Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.’’ 55

The Development of the Interpretation of ‘‘Intent’’ within
the Convention
The ILC’s Draft Codes of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind was one
of the first detailed documents concerning what was meant by the word ‘‘intent’’
within the definition of genocide. Article 17 of this document focuses on the crime of
genocide. Article 17(5) states that ‘‘an individual incurs responsibility for the crime
of genocide only when one of the prohibited acts is committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a group, as such.’’ 56 Although this document states that intent is
required, Article 17(10) argues that such intent can be inferred from knowledge of
the discriminatory effects of his acts in destruction of a targeted group:
(10) . . . Indeed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide explicitly recognizes in article IV that the crime of genocide may be committed by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
The definition of the crime of genocide would be equally applicable to any individual
who committed one of the prohibited acts with the necessary intent. The extent of
knowledge of the details of a plan or a policy to carry out the crime of genocide would
vary depending on the position of the perpetrator in the governmental hierarchy or
the military command structure. This does not mean that a subordinate who actually
carries out the plan or policy cannot be held responsible for the crime of genocide
simply because he did not possess the same degree of information concerning the
overall plan or policy as his superiors. The definition of the crime of genocide requires
a degree of knowledge of the ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than
knowledge of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy of genocide. A subordinate
is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors when he receives orders to
commit the prohibited acts against individuals who belong to a particular group. He
cannot escape responsibility if he carries out the orders to commit the destructive
acts against victims who are selected because of their membership in a particular
group by claiming that he was not privy to all aspects of the comprehensive genocidal
plan or policy. The law does not permit an individual to shield himself from criminal
responsibility by ignoring the obvious. For example, a soldier who is ordered to go
from house to house and kill only persons who are members of a particular group
cannot be unaware of the irrelevance of the identity of the victims and the significance of their membership in a particular group. He cannot be unaware of the
destructive effect of this criminal conduct on the group itself. Thus, the necessary
degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature of the order to
commit the prohibited acts of destruction against individuals who belong to a particular group and are therefore singled out as the immediate victims of the massive
criminal conduct.57

This section may mention the individual needing the ‘‘necessary’’ intent, but it
also states that intent and knowledge would be enough to be convicted of genocide.
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The ILC, as shown above, indicates that if a person commits one of the acts with the
knowledge that it is part of an orchestrated effort targeted at a particular group, this
would be sufficient for the individual to be convicted of genocide. This again argues
for a knowledge-based approach to the requirement of intent in the Convention.
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
relation to crimes committed by a collective for a common purpose, gives examples
of the level of responsibility for individuals involved:
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(d) In any other way continues to the commission or attempted commission of such
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contributions shall
be intentional and shall either
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.58

One reason the Genocide Convention was created was to ensure that those guilty
of genocide were punished. Although not required for conviction, genocide does
usually involve a plan. Genocide is not one act; it is a collection of acts committed
by a number of people that when put together, if successful, would bring about the
destruction of a group, in whole or in part.
It is correct that genocide would not happen if people did not organize and
orchestrate the process and/or plan. However, it is also true that genocide could not
go beyond the stages of planning if people did not willingly act. The people who
commit the actus reus of genocide are not just aiding and abetting, or being complicit
in the crime of genocide. These people are in fact at the center of the prohibited acts
that constitute genocide, therefore, at the center of the crime. For this reason, they
should not be allowed to escape punishment for that crime. All free persons are
responsible for their own actions and should be held responsible for them. If someone
willingly commits a prohibited act knowing of a coordinated effort by others against
a targeted group, then they should know that this will threaten the survival of the
group. If they continue to act, they do have the intent for the group to be destroyed,
whether they choose to admit it or not. If they are of sound mind, then they are fully
aware of their actions and what their actions could lead to. To plead ignorance is
inappropriate. People need to consider carefully the actions they take before taking
them. The dolus specialis requirement is therefore unsuitable because, regardless of
an individual’s expressed intentions, he/she is still actively involved in genocide and
plays a crucial part. Without these actions, the lives of many victims could be
spared. The individuals are as much to blame as the people who orchestrated the
‘‘plan.’’ A lower form of intent should, therefore, be used as this will not restrict
punishment to just a selection of leaders. Aiding and abetting charges should be
used for people who did not commit a prohibited act, but still helped enable genocide
to occur. The people who committed the prohibited acts are far too involved to be
seen only as accomplices. They are at the center of the crime and their acts are the
ones that bring about the destruction of the group. Their willingness to commit these
acts, with knowledge that they would bring about the destruction of the group,
should suffice. The focus should be on preventing group destruction, not only on
punishing people with ‘‘specific’’ intent.
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If the knowledge-based approach was adopted, while the number of people
prosecuted for genocide would increase, it could also have an additional effect on
prevention. Genocide is a systematic crime that, to take place, needs the actions of
many people. If people knew that by participating in prohibited acts there was a
high chance that they would be prosecuted for their part, and if they were convicted
of genocide they could spend the rest of their lives in prison (as opposed to a
few years if convicted of a lesser crime), this would undoubtedly act as a deterrent.
During the drafting of the Convention, the French delegate made this exact point:
Mr. CHAUMONT (France) maintained that the punishment of a soldier, which did
not of course exclude the punishment of an officer, was intended to produce the
profound psychological effect, the deterrent value of which had been stressed by
the representative of Czechoslovakia.59

Intent, as discussed above, is a personal state of mind and very difficult to prove
if not openly expressed. Stanton determined that denial is the eighth and final stage
of genocide, and that it operates throughout the genocidal process. This is because
genocide is a crime that aims at completely removing the memory of a group’s
existence. Perpetrators ‘‘deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame
what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crime, and continue
to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile.’’ 60 The perpetrators always state that they are not committing genocide. Their denial is in fact
part of the crime. By requiring strict specific intent proven beyond a reasonable
doubt as in a court of law, we are actually accommodating their criminality. The
possibility that perpetrators will not only deny that the crime is taking place, but
also destroy all evidence of the crime, is highly likely. Requiring dolus specialis is
assisting this stage of genocide and works against the purpose of the Convention:
Genocide being based on the denial of the victims’ very existence, it is therefore
unsurprising that denial of a given genocide is nothing but the universal strategy
of perpetrators who thus typically deny either that the events took place, or that
they bear any responsibility for the destruction, or still that the term ‘‘genocide’’ is
applicable to what occurred.61

Conclusion
As stressed throughout this article, the focus has always been, and should remain,
on preventing the destruction of particular groups. Lemkin saw the destruction of
the group as a crime, because it would mean humanity had lost the unique contribution that the group would bring to the world. For Lemkin, the key purpose of
the Convention was to ensure that the group would continue to exist, and that any
planned acts systematically orchestrated to threaten its existence would be stopped
and punished. The crime of genocide is special because it focuses on groups, as such,
as opposed to individuals. The drafting of the Convention developed this idea and
left the notion of ‘‘intent’’ open to interpretation. The Travaux Préparatoires of the
drafters does not support the dolus specialis interpretation.
The ILC’s statements began with a specific intent approach, but also allowed for
the knowledge-based approach. The courts seem to be split: The ICTY has taken the
restrictive approach, which has left it with questionable results. The ICTR, on the
other hand, has convicted many defendants, both because Rwanda was clearly a
case of genocide, but also because the ICTR has adopted a broader, knowledge-based
interpretation and has convicted defendants on evidence of the person’s involvement
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and foresight. Although there are currently no case study examples of the International Criminal Court’s interpretation of intent within the genocide definition, Article
30 of the statute shows an obvious move toward a knowledge-based approach. Some
have argued that ‘‘unless otherwise provided’’ means that because genocide is known
as a specific intent crime, intent is already provided. However, the challenged section
of the Convention’s definition simply states ‘‘committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part,’’ and does not detail what type of intent is required. It is therefore
argued that the ‘‘unless otherwise provided’’ stipulation should refer to the section in
the Convention containing the prohibited acts. For example, the word ‘‘deliberately’’
in the following quotation points to the act requiring premeditation and positive
action rather than recklessness or knowledge: ‘‘(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.’’ 62
The use of dolus specialis as the intent required by the Genocide Convention completely goes beyond the original intent of the Convention’s drafters, and
especially beyond the intent of Raphael Lemkin. Before dolus specialis was held to
be the required intent in the Akayesu trial, no legal document or UN paper had
associated it with the crime. Although an argument was put forward in the Travaux
Préparatoires to allow judges the freedom to interpret, this was because all cases
would involve different circumstances and levels of involvement, requiring a caseby-case interpretation. It was not meant to allow a judge’s decision to restrict future
decisions.
Once violence has begun, however, if it becomes obvious that a group is being
systematically targeted with acts, such as that prohibited by the Genocide Convention, then prevention efforts should commence. Hopefully prevention, beginning
with early warning systems, will one day be effectively used by governments to
alleviate tensions before violence begins. The key to genocide prevention is early
action. We cannot let another situation like Darfur take place. When the existence
of a group is threatened, the intentions of perpetrators are seldom openly expressed.
It is unacceptable that more than sixty years after the Holocaust was uncovered, a
genocide hidden from the world by the Nazis, genocides are still occurring and that
the international ‘‘community’’ continues to ignore them.
Genocide is a very serious crime and should remain as such. Although it is
uncommon, when it does take place, it is not just because a few people wanted it to
happen. People need to take responsibility for their actions. A general intent would
be too low a standard for the crime of genocide, but committing an act with the
knowledge that it will help an ongoing plan to destroy a group is sufficient evidence
to prove intent to commit genocide. If perpetrators are only attacking a section of the
group, such as men, then it is still obvious that this would have a devastating effect
on the existence of that group. For someone to escape punishment because they
either did not possess a plan to eliminate an entire group, or simply did not concern
themselves with the consequences of their actions, is unacceptable. Adopting the
dolus specialis requirement renders the Genocide Convention’s preventive purpose
incredibly difficult. By adopting the knowledge-based approach, anyone willingly
committing a prohibited act knowing that it would contribute to an ongoing offensive
against a group would be liable for conviction for that crime.
The move away from the creator’s and drafters’ original meaning of intent in the
Genocide Convention urgently needs to be corrected. The focus needs to return to
protecting groups. The knowledge-based interpretation is the most suitable means
for achieving this end. As demonstrated by the evidence above, this approach would
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not only restore the original intent of the Genocide Convention, but would also give
it a new power that is now vitiated by debates over whether atrocities possess the
‘‘specific intent’’ to qualify as genocide. This knowledge-based meaning of intent is
what was always intended by Lemkin and the drafters when they decided to adopt
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in
1948, and it is what should be required now.
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